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 Abstract 
In this report, the aircraft and space vehicle requirements for 
composite structures are compared. It is a valuable exercise to 
study composite structural design approaches used in the airframe 
industry and to adopt methodology that is applicable for space 
vehicles.  The missions, environments, analysis methods, analysis 
validation approaches, testing programs, build quantities, 
inspection, and maintenance procedures used by the airframe 
industry, in general, are not transferable to spaceflight hardware.  
Therefore, while the application of composite design approaches 
from aircraft and other industries is appealing, many aspects 
cannot be directly utilized.  Nevertheless, experiences and research 
for composite aircraft structures may be of use in unexpected 
arenas as space exploration technology develops, and so continued 
technology exchanges are encouraged.  
1.0 Introduction 
Aircraft and space vehicle structures are performance structures.  Because of their light weight 
and high strength, composites are potential candidates for these structures [1].  They are widely 
used in secondary structures and are currently making their way into aircraft primary structures 
such as wings and fuselage components (Boeing 787 Dreamliner, Airbus A380 aircrafts, and 
many military aircraft (F-22, F-35)).  While space vehicles are behind in the use of composites, 
composites are considered attractive alternatives to metallic structures.  When new materials are 
considered for structural applications, one of the first issues to confront would be the 
requirements for these structures and structural components [2].  The purpose of this paper is to 
attempt a comparison of the requirements for composite structures for aircraft and space 
applications. 
The paper is organized as follows.  First, a general discussion on special features of composites 
is presented.  This is followed by a general comparison of features of aircraft and spacecraft 
missions.  Then, the comparison of requirements for design allowables, development of these 
allowables, factors of safety, structural integrity, and damage tolerance is presented.  For 
convenience in presentation, spacecraft and space vehicle structures are used interchangeably. 
2.0 Special Features of Composites 
Compared to widely used metallic materials, composites differ significantly in many 
characteristics.  Some of these special features of composites are presented here.  
 Composites demonstrate high strength-to-weight ratios. 
 Composites exhibit higher dimensional stability, corrosion resistance, and thermal cycling 
capability. 
 Composites provide numerous options for structural tailoring for known loading conditions. 
 Constituent materials in the composite strongly influence composite structure’s stiffness, strength, 
and durability. 
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 Composites have practically no ductility.  Most composites are brittle and have a nearly linear 
stress-strain law to failure. 
 Composites are non-isotropic and are inhomogeneous. 
 The mechanical properties of composites have a strong link to the manufacturing processes.  
Therefore, one needs to pay special attention to the manufacturing processes, realize that there 
can be wide variability in the allowables data, and realize the need for a careful building-block 
test program to develop the design allowable data. 
 Composites are highly sensitive to notches.  Stress concentration factors higher than ten are 
possible for some notches, and the stress gradients near the notches are very high.  
 In composites, large in-plane stress gradients develop near geometric and material discontinuities.  
In-plane stress gradients lead to out-of-plane or interlaminar stresses.  Because composites have 
low through-the-thickness strength, delaminations can initiate and grow.  Delaminations degrade 
the strength of the composite laminate and can lead to failure.  Figure 1 shows some typical 
configurations susceptible to interlaminar stresses where delaminations initiate because of 
geometric and material discontinuities. 
 Composites degrade due to moisture, humidity, and heat.  The coefficient of thermal expansion 
along the fiber direction is near zero or a small negative number compared to the other two 
transverse directions.   
 Composites are sensitive to accidental damages.  There is a significant loss of strength due to 
low-velocity impacts.  Figure 2 shows the dramatic reduction in compression after impact 
strength as a function of impact energy for a commonly used composite system.  In thick 
composites, the damage due to these impacts is in the interior of the laminate and is either not 
visible on the outer surfaces of the laminate or is barely visible. 
 Composites have low sensitivity to fatigue for in-plane loading. 
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Figure 1.  Sources of delaminations at geometric and material discontinuities. 
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Figure 2.  Compression after impact strength for AS4/3501-6 composite laminate  
(NASA Langley test data, see Ref. 1). 
3.0 Comparison of Mission Requirements 
The commercial and military aircraft industries base their requirements on the performance 
required out of the appropriate certifying authority.  Commercial transport aircraft usually have a 
design life of 75,000 cycles (take-offs and landings) over 30 years.  Military transport aircraft 
may have similar operational life.  Many copies, perhaps thousands of copies, of commercial 
aircraft are built, while tens to a few hundred copies of military aircraft are built.  The 
manufacturing processes are highly specialized by suppliers through extensive testing of 
company designs of materials, coupons, joints, components, and structural elements.  As a result 
of this comprehensive testing, an extensive database of material properties and structural 
performance data is created for each system.  The aircrafts are certified to meet applicable 
requirements based on detailed reviews that ensure that the aircraft meet safety and performance 
criteria for the fleet mission environments and loadings, which are usually well defined [3-5] and 
can be incorporated in the certification test programs.  In addition, the aircraft applications rely 
on extensive development programs that continue into the operational and maintenance regimes 
of the mission lifetime.  These programs ensure continued airworthiness through periodic 
inspections that may include depot re-work using certified repair and/or structural upgrades as 
needed throughout the mission lifetime (see Refs. 3-5). 
In contrast, space vehicle missions typically have no or very limited opportunities to inspect, 
repair, or modify the structure once they lift off from the launch pad.  This is a major and 
fundamental difference between the aircraft approach and the spacecraft approach to composite 
structural design methodology.  While the aircraft in-service inspection/repair approach could be 
adopted for any space vehicle that returns periodically to Earth, it would require the space 
vehicle program to develop and certify capabilities similar to those in use for aircraft while 
addressing the more challenging aspects of missions that operate in space environments.  There 
are some examples within the NASA Space Shuttle Program where refurbishment of vehicle 
components is performed, but this practice is not common because of the risks of damage to 
expensive space-qualified vehicles.  Instead, spacecraft structures are typically designed for a 
single launch and are certified to perform their entire mission without interim inspections or 
repairs to reduce operational costs.  
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Space vehicles experience unique environments and loadings, and there will be few opportunities 
to validate the vehicle’s structural performance under the mission conditions.  Therefore, the 
space vehicle structural design must be more robust than a design obtained using comparable 
aircraft structural design procedures.  Furthermore, at most, only a few copies of the space 
vehicle structure will probably be built – perhaps more launch vehicles than crew modules and 
even fewer lunar and interplanetary systems.  Thus while some aspects of the aircraft industry’s 
composite design best practices (such as those for ply drops, stacking sequences, fiber/resin 
combinations, etc.) may benefit composite spacecraft structural design, most of their best 
practices may not be directly applicable to spacecraft composite structures.  Nevertheless, a 
careful comparison of requirements for aircraft and spacecraft composite structures is very 
useful.  
4.0 Comparison of Specific Requirements 
Five major requirements for both aircraft and spacecraft structures are discussed and compared.  
The requirements are focused on the standard practices as they are followed today for composite 
structures.   
4.1 Relevant Design Allowables: 
Strength allowables are consistent between the aircraft and spacecraft applications.  Both aircraft 
and spacecraft standards require that strength allowables should properly account for the effects 
of environment (e.g., temperature, humidity, vacuum, chemicals), but beyond that they do not 
specify which properties (e.g., notched or unnotched strength) should be used for design 
allowables.  
Strength allowable values are generated typically using uniaxial tests performed at different 
environmental conditions (e.g., different values of temperature, humidity).  These values are 
usually from load-to-failure tests with maximum load (‘stress’) and strain-at-failure recorded.  
For composite systems exhibiting a nonlinear response, repeated loading-unloading cycles with 
increasing load level may provide insight into the overall material response (i.e., nonlinear elastic 
or damage accumulation). 
The definition of statistical sampling and data reduction methods for what constitutes an A- or B-
basis for strength allowables is common among the aircraft and spacecraft design standards.  
Also common is the general requirement that B-basis design allowables will be used for a 
redundant or fail-safe structure and A-basis design allowables will be used for a single load path 
structure.  A redundant or fail safe structure is defined as follows:  A structural design criterion 
in which it must be shown that the structure remaining, after failure of any single structural 
member, can withstand the resulting redistributed internal limit loads without failure.  The ability 
to sustain a failure and retain the capability to safely terminate or control the operation.  Thus, 
redundant fail-safe structural designs are desirable.  In fact, space vehicle fail-safe structural 
designs using B-basis strength allowables are used by the current NASA [6-9] and European 
Space Agency (ESA) requirements [10-12]. 
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Joint designs, whether bolted or bonded or both, are complex structural components.  Load paths 
and reactions are dependent on many factors associated with the joint itself.  Adding redundancy 
in the joint system does add complexity with respect to load path and other geometric limitation 
along with additional mass.  Incorporating redundancy in a specific joint design to give fail-safe 
capability and migrate from an A-basis allowable requirement to a B-basis requirement may be 
as difficult or costly to achieve as establishing an A-basis allowable for the specific joint 
configuration.  The interaction of other joint factors or fitting factors also needs to be reviewed in 
the designs.  The airframe industry typically establishes statistically relevant performance data 
for each major joint configuration through comprehensive test programs.  The industry also 
maintains heritage configurations and databases for each design.  While it may be desired, it is 
unlikely that such an approach will be used for composite spacecraft structures. 
Probabilistic or non-deterministic design approaches are being proposed and pose an additional 
paradox.  Without statistically relevant data, mean values, standard deviations, and distribution 
forms for design allowables will have to be assumed and this would result in uncertainties in the 
analytical predictions.  These predictions can be used to determine the relative sensitivity of 
selected response variables within assumed ranges and distributions.  This paradox will most 
likely lead to specific focused building-block test programs for key design-driving parameters. 
4.2 Development of Relevant Design Allowables: 
A building-block approach starts by studying simple basic configurations and then builds in 
complexities associated with the design in a systematic and progressive manner [1, 13, 14].  A 
basic building-block program can have different objectives, goals, and scope depending on the 
application and the program.  In most cases, the objective of the building-block approach is to 
establish statistically relevant design allowables through an extensive test program moving from 
coupon-level specimens to component-level tests and even to full-scale tests.  In other cases, the 
objective of the building-block approach is to define the composite structural strength and to 
identify and characterize failure modes using a limited number of specimens.  In yet other cases, 
the building-block information must be sufficient to guide the definition of a meaningful full-
scale/component test – including consideration for appropriate type/size/amount of damage [1, 
13].  Figure 3 and 4 demonstrate how this is practiced currently for aircraft structures.  For 
composite structures design for aircraft and spacecraft, multiple types of building-block 
programs may be required to develop robust composite designs that fully exploit the potential of 
each composite material system. 
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Figure 3.  Building block test approach. 
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Figure 4.  Design development test specimens (numbers in parenthesis refer to the number of 
replicates for each different specimen, see Ref. 1). 
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While the building-block approach has all the aforementioned advantages, the approach has 
some disadvantages.  A “properly executed” building-block approach as used by the airframe 
industry may not be practical for space vehicle designs from a cost-schedule perspective.  The 
airframe industry’s building-block approach usually involves testing of hundreds of specimens.  
For the airframe industry, significant R&D resources are put into understanding their specific 
structural systems and generating the necessary databases sufficient for design and certification.  
The resource cost of this effort can be amortized across the fleet of vehicles produced.  
Unfortunately, the space vehicle industry only produces a limited number of products making the 
institution of an extensive building-block test program impractical from a cost perspective.   
Often, spacecraft structural systems are unique or application dependent.  Design-allowable data 
from a building-block approach may not be available early enough in the design cycle to affect 
the robustness or efficiency of the spacecraft design.  A generalized building-block test program 
may produce design data and expose structural weaknesses.  However, unless the test program 
performs testing of all material, configurations, and loading complexities, some structural 
weaknesses may not be identified before a flight mission or before a catastrophic failure at worst, 
or before large-scale damage testing results are obtained.  Furthermore, this building-block 
approach could potentially lead to major program redesign/development cost increases and 
schedule delays.  Finally, due to the extreme complexity or impossibility of a priori knowledge 
and simulation capability of the spacecraft operational environment on Earth, the development of 
a fully encompassing building-block program may not be achievable.   
Clearly, traditional building-block approaches used by the aircraft industry are not directly 
applicable for space vehicles.  For successful composite structures and structural components, an 
appropriate building-block approach needs to be designed and executed to exploit all the 
benefits, avoid the pit-falls, and mitigate known risks. 
4.3 Factors of Safety: 
The historic factor of safety (FOS) for aircraft structures is 1.5 [15], while for space vehicle 
structures it is 1.4 [16].  These FOS are used generally for most of the acreage areas of the 
structures exhibiting near uniform stress states, and specific parts have higher factors.  There is a 
significant difference in the NASA approach to areas of discontinuities and this will be discussed 
next. 
In the NASA-STD-5001A [16], “discontinuities are defined as an interruption in the physical 
structure or configuration of the part.  Delaminations, debonds, and dropping of plies are all 
assumed to be discontinuities.”  In addition, the term “discontinuity area” is defined in a recent 
structural design verification requirements document [6] as:  “A local region of a composite or 
non-metallic structure consisting of built-up plies, chopped fiber or reinforced regions around 
fittings, joints or interfaces where the stress state and load distribution within the region may be 
difficult to characterize.  A region is considered a discontinuity area until uniform section 
properties in the structure can be considered in the structural analysis.  Bonded joints are 
considered discontinuities.”   
In the preliminary design phase of aircraft or spacecraft, predictive analysis tools and techniques 
for local discontinuities in composite structures are difficult to incorporate (and validate) in the 
design process.  At the present time, these analysis tools and modeling practices are not 
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sufficiently robust and general to provide adequate fidelity of the stress state in areas of 
discontinuities.  Through-the-thickness or out-of-plane stresses may not be correctly 
characterized and understood, leading to incorrect characterization of these discontinuities.  In 
part, the use of a discontinuity area FOS is applied to address the modeling and analysis 
uncertainties early in the design.  
The discontinuity area FOS approach is suggested and defined for strength requirements in 
NASA-STD-5001A [16] and in the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Commercial Space 
Transportation guidance document for reusable launch and reentry vehicles [17].  FOS listed in 
NASA-STD-5001A [16] are stated as “minimum” values, and some structural members or 
systems may be required to meet other more stringent and restrictive performance requirements.  
Specific material systems and design configurations need to be tested to determine statistically 
relevant allowable data and characterization of failure modes.  Such testing typically is 
performed as an integral part of a larger building-block test program for the overall design and is 
representative of current best practices.   
A possible misconception within the spacecraft technical community regarding FOS also needs 
to be addressed here.  The misconception is that the FOS covers uncertainty in loads and/or 
material properties.  The uncertainty in the loads is not covered by the FOS and needs to be 
accounted for by the use of appropriate load uncertainty factors (LUF).  These LUFs depend on 
the environment in which the structure operates.  In contrast, in the aircraft technical community, 
most references state that the FOS is for loads greater than those assumed (overshoots), and for 
uncertainties in design and fabrication (e.g., see W. G. Heath in Ref. 15, pp. 1526).  In a similar 
manner, the uncertainty in material properties is not covered by the FOS.  The uncertainties in 
the material properties need to be accounted for by the use of A-basis and B-basis properties for 
the operating environments.  These FOS account for uncertainties and variations that cannot be 
analyzed or accounted for in a rational manner, including modeling uncertainties, analysis 
assumptions, defects in material and fabrication issues, and unknown/unexpected aspects of 
complex structures.   
In summary, a comprehensive building-block approach to developing statistically relevant data is 
the correct technical approach for space vehicle composite structures.  However, the practical 
application of such an approach may not be cost effective or feasible.  On the other hand, when 
the building-block approach for composite spacecraft structures is attempted but not “properly 
executed” due to cost and schedule constraints, there is a risk of structural failures.  A 
methodology that establishes a balance between the deterministic FOS approach and a sufficient 
building-block program is needed.  
4.4 Structural Integrity: 
Generally, structural integrity is evaluated based on the following three factors: 
 The maximum estimated structural response.  The estimated or anticipated structural response is 
usually determined through established analysis and/or test methods. 
 The uncertainty of the estimate.  The uncertainty in the estimated structural response is 
established through best practice.  NASA-STD-5001A [16] represents NASA’s view of the 
current “best practice” for establishing FOS for spaceflight hardware [18] and damage tolerance 
for composite structures is established using MSFC-RQMT-3479 [9].  However, these FOS 
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values may be tailored by Programs provided an adequate engineering risk assessment is 
performed and approval is obtained from the appropriate Technical Authority.   
 The capability of the structure.  The structural capability is generally established by material 
capabilities. 
This paradigm for structural integrity is well accepted in the metallic structures community 
where analysis methods and material capabilities are well understood.  However, in composite 
structural systems, the material capability is heavily influenced by the geometry, laminate 
stacking sequences, material architecture (uni-directional tape, fabric, textiles), manufacturing 
processes, and bulk material properties.  These influencing factors lead to additional uncertainty 
in the structural integrity of composite systems.  This uncertainty primarily pertains to structural 
regions, such as joints, variable thickness regions, stiffeners, or cut-outs, where the stress state or 
load path is difficult to assess using current analytical tools and methodologies and where the 
stress state is strongly dependent on the material definition, material properties, and fabrication.  
The airframe and space vehicle industries handle this additional uncertainty in different ways.  
The airframe industry maintains a consistent single FOS that covers general uncertainty (1.5) 
combined with a reliance on an extensive building-block test program to determine the structural 
capability.  Such a program could involve hundreds of tests for a structural application using a 
specific material, fabrication processes, configurations, loadings, and damage in order to 
establish a statistical basis [14].  In contrast, the current NASA-STD-5001A [16] practice, as 
well as the FAA guidance document for reusable launch and reentry vehicles [17], relies on a 
dual FOS approach:  one FOS is applicable to areas of the structure where the response is well 
understood (for example, 1.4 for uniform areas); and another FOS for areas of the structure that 
are not well understood (for example, 2.0 for discontinuity areas).  However, the material 
properties are left to the individual programs to establish.  NASA-STD-5001A states: 
“designs are assumed to use materials having mechanical properties that are well 
characterized for the intended service environments and all design conditions … 
Material allowables shall be chosen to minimize the probability of structural failure 
due to material variability … Allowables shall be based on sufficient material tests to 
establish values on a statistical basis” 
Again, these requirements are well understood and applied for metallic structural systems.  
However, they become problematic for composite systems because of the influencing factors 
previously mentioned.  Hence, the airframe industry approach to developing material allowable 
data using a building-block approach appears attractive, but for spacecraft, the development of 
statistically relevant data is not always feasible.  To further complicate the issue, in using the 
deterministic approach, there is evidence [4, 19] that a factor of 2.0 may not be conservative 
depending on the severity of manufacturing flaws, design features such as cutouts and holes, 
and/or impact damage.  Higher FOS values may be warranted in some cases depending on the 
adequacy of the test database, the conservatism of the design allowable, inclusion of knockdown 
factors, and the method of design verification.   
In situations where structurally similar design and fabrication processes have demonstrated 
reliable strength in well-defined loading/environment conditions, Section 4.4 of NASA-STD-
5001A [16] has a provision to request an alternative approach by waiver when a substantial case 
can be made.  This waiver would need to be approved by the responsible program authorities and 
technical authorities.  Finally, in the event a structural weakness is discovered late in the 
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structural development program or launch planning and provided testing establishes that the 
weakness is an acceptable risk, then this waiver process can be pursued.  Note that such an 
approach is feasible only when the component was originally designed with the specified FOS. 
4.5 Damage Tolerance: 
For commercial aircraft structures, damage tolerance is achieved through a methodology 
developed by the FAA [20] and is shown in Figure 5.  Military aircraft structures use a similar 
method that is stated in the Department of Defense Joint Service Specification Guide [3].  In this 
figure, the design load level is plotted against increasing damage severity.  On the abscissa, the 
allowable damage limit (ADL) and critical damage threshold (CDT) are plotted.  The ADL 
corresponds to the limit of the Category-1 damage – “Barely Visible Impact Damage” (BVID) 
and “Allowed Manufacturing Damage”.  The CDT corresponds to the damage limit when the 
residual strength of the structure falls below the design limit load (DLL).  Note that aircraft 
composite structures are required to carry the design ultimate load (DUL) with any non-
detectable damage.  For reduced load capability with “Category 2 or 3” damage conditions, the 
structure is not permitted to have reduced strength below DLL.  In addition, the flight mission is 
adjusted such that opportunities for certified inspection that detects the damage and certified 
repairs that restores the structure to ultimate load capability are provided.  (In fact, in 
determining the CDT, one missed inspection cycle is built in.)  Category-4 damage, such as 
liberation of rotor blade and subsequent impact with the aircraft structure, bird strikes, lightning 
damage, hail damage, etc., would cause a loss of limit load capability.  However, in these 
situations, the pilot is aware of the damage and will execute a safe landing by adjusting the flight 
envelope to reduce flight loads.  
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Figure 5.  Damage tolerance philosophy currently used by airplanes. (DUL = 1.5 * DLL. The 
structure has to sustain design ultimate loads in the presence of non-detectable damage) 
The Category-1 damage indicated in Figure 5 that corresponds to space applications would likely 
include damage due to fabrication, assembly, ground handling, transportation, and any other 
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sources of damage occurring prior to launch.  According to the aircraft criteria, this damage must 
not decrease strength below ultimate strength, which is the same as the existing space vehicle 
requirement [9].  In addition, space missions must consider damage due to all other sources that 
may occur during a spacecraft mission that includes:  liftoff, ascent, time spent in orbit from risk 
of impact by micrometeoroids or other space debris, the return to Earth, and subsequent 
missions.  Additional unique damage risks may exist during long-duration lunar and 
interplanetary missions.  These aspects are addressed in the damage threat assessments and the 
strength with damage requirements of Ref. 9.  Damage from impact threats after launch and their 
consequences for space missions are uniquely different from those of the airframe industry. 
No space mission conditions are known at this time that permit the use of the aircraft Category 2, 
3, or 4 damage indicated in Figure 5 because inspection and repair capability are not feasible 
once the space vehicle is launched.   
The NASA fracture control damage tolerance requirements for composites specified in Section 
5.3.2.6 of Ref. 9 do not permit damage growth.  This requirement was instituted to control risk of 
fracture in composites because technology for predicting damage initiation and accumulation for 
composites is not as reliable as it is for metals.  This requirement is similar to what is currently 
practiced by the aircraft industry.  A new fracture control standard, NASA-STD-5019A [21] that 
is applicable to both metallic and composite materials, is developed recently.  It is also expected 
that this standards development activity will offer opportunity for discussion of different 
approaches to composite spacecraft structural design requirements.   
In summary, the key points related to damage tolerance requirements are: 
 Aircraft requirements are similar to space vehicle requirements to sustain ultimate loads with 
manufacturing and other defects/damage before launch. 
 Aircraft requirements permit some strength reduction below ultimate for Category 2 or 3 damage, 
but this is different from usual space applications because: 
o Aircraft practice specifies periodic depot inspections and repairs are performed to ensure 
continued airworthiness, and 
o Aircraft practice requires inspections and repairs to restore the structure to ultimate load 
capacity within a short fraction of the mission life between the required depot work. 
 Space vehicle programs usually do not include development of certified inspection and repairs of 
structure to restore it to ultimate strength capacity after launch.  In addition, usually there are no 
opportunities for these activities once the spacecraft has been launched.  
5.0 Concluding Remarks 
Composites are being widely used in aircraft structures because of their high strength-to-weight 
ratios.  Their use in space applications is increasing.  The requirements for composite structures 
for aircraft and space applications are compared and discussed.  The requirements for design 
allowables, strength allowables, factors of safety, structural integrity, and damage tolerance are 
compared.  To develop design allowables, the aircraft industry employs a building-block 
approach involving testing of hundreds of specimens.  As space vehicles are only produced in 
extremely limited numbers, traditional building-block approaches such as that used by the 
aircraft industry are impractical from a cost and schedule perspective.  Requirements for strength 
allowables, on the other hand, are consistent between the aircraft and spacecraft applications.  
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The requirements on factors of safety used by the spacecraft structures are more stringent than 
those for the aircraft structures.  To ensure structural integrity, a comprehensive building-block 
approach to developing statistically relevant data is the approach used by both aircraft and 
spacecraft composite structures.  For space applications, a methodology that establishes a 
balance between factor of safety and building-block testing that is tailored for specific 
applications is needed.  To ensure damage tolerance, aircraft and spacecraft follow similar 
requirements for composite structures.  Aircraft requirements are similar to space vehicle 
requirements to sustain ultimate loads with manufacturing and other defects/damage before 
launch.  Aircraft practice requires periodic inspections and restoration of the structure to design 
ultimate load capacity many times during its mission life.  Most space vehicles do not have such 
opportunities after launch and lift-off.  Thus, the damage tolerance requirements for aircraft and 
space vehicles are much different with only similarities up to the allowable damage limit. 
Because of mission and operations differences, the requirements for composite structures for 
aircraft applications are not directly applicable as requirements for space vehicle applications.  
Space vehicles experience unique environments and loadings and there will be fewer, if any, 
opportunities to inspect and repair the vehicle’s structure and validate its structural performance 
under mission conditions.  Therefore, the space vehicle composite structural design must be 
more robust than the aircraft composite structural design.  Nevertheless, the aircraft industry’s 
experience with composite structures provides a knowledge base for consideration and possible 
adaptability to spacecraft composite structural design. 
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